I have very competent friends who get frustrated by the incompetence of others and my sympathy for them is usually tempered by my sympathy for the incompetent person who has irritated them, especially because I myself am incompetent at a lot of things many other people are quite good at doing. But today I was thinking about the competence of one of these friends and wondered how innate it really was, realising in fact she has probably become so competent because her role has required her to be, in order not to let anyone else down and in order to be able to compensate for the incompetence of others. Rather than an innate gift for competence she is just more willing than most to learn how to do things and take care to do them properly. So competence has a moral aspect to it I hadn't really thought about before. This is a small thought but I think it is complete.
How can aeneous mean bronze-coloured as in “brassy or golden green,” asks the classicist Shadi Bartsch? Most of the replies to her question pointed to the copper in bronze that turns green when it oxidises, but that is a blue green, not a golden green. For Homer, the sky was bronze, but was it golden-green, or the blue of oxidation? – and the sea was wine-dark, but was it red? Are the Greeks really talking about colour at all? It is as if one culture hearing an orchestra is listening only to the pitch of the notes, and another culture is listening to the sounds the different instruments are making, so a description of the sound an oboe makes is met with the bewildered response that is sounds like a description of C# yet surely the note is more of a A, and helpful scholars finally find a way of hearing it perhaps as a rather flat B flat. But I like the idea of seeing the world less in terms of colours and more in terms of texture. Not just any texture either, but the specific texture of how light reflects off objects – a world of varying degrees of shimmer and shine, depth and detail. It makes me want to describe something as wine-light, thinking of the way the clarity of white wine in a glass is a particularly lit-up clarity, holding lightness as both brilliance and levity, and how this might describe the character of a person, just as another person could be described as wine-dark, with wine-dark depths you could get lost in.
Brian Blanchfield takes what has sometimes been seen as a problem, that poetry is mostly only read by other poets, and points out that this suggests the act of reading poetry turns readers into poets, which could be something to celebrate. Brian Blanchfield is a poet himself but such a brilliant essayist he has turned me into an essay reader, though I am not yet quite turned into an essay writer the way Jan Morris has turned me into a (sometimes) thought diarist. If poets have had to be reassured about the tendency for poetry readers to become poets, philosophers, Agnes Callard reveals, have always set out “to infect others with our need to find answers,” describing the philosopher “as an especially needy kind of truth-seeker. Like vampires, zombies and werewolves, we are creatives who need company, and will do whatever it takes to create it.” I seem to be very susceptible to the infection and here is another thought posting that starts with a question Agnes Callard raises, this time in an article “Should we cancel Aristotle?” The answer is no but not because his views on slavery or women’s rights are defensible, and not because they can be overlooked as tangential to his thinking, but because his culture is so alien to our own we can argue against his views with no fear of them being politically dangerous. But this is how we should approach all views, if we could approach all views philosophically, as if every idea could be examined without fear of the political dangers not of implementing it but of even considering it. We have a cancel culture, Agnes Callard argues, because we’ve got caught up in a messaging culture, in which “every speech act is classified as friend or foe, in which literal content can barely be communicated, and in which very little faith exists as to the rational faculties of those being spoken to.” So she calls for “the freedom to speak literally,” which I suppose is also a request to be listened to literally. I was so interested, and quite persuaded, by this framing of the issue in terms of a contrast between messaging and speaking literally, it made me wonder where poetry fits in. The literal is much more ordinarily thought of as the opposite of the figurative, the space where poetry finds its resonance. But if poetry is the opposite of the literal, it is the opposite of messaging also. I have now reached the beginning of the thought I was going to post, but only by already pruning off a few offshoots, and the thought itself is clearly going to want to branch out into quite a tangle of thinking so instead I will just stop and admire the surprising situation of poetry that Agnes Callard has made apparent, as it sits as the opposite both to the literal, and to messaging, at one and the same time.