Anna Jackson
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    • Pasture and Flock
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    • Last stop before insomnia
    • Dear tombs, dear horizon
    • The Bedmaking Competition
  • About
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24/12/2019 0 Comments

On translation


My friend Rose’s father was a brilliant linguist who spoke more languages than I can count and was always learning another one.  The translation career he could have had! – as I helpfully pointed out to him.  “Why would I want to waste my time translating from a language I already know,” he said, “when I could be using the time to learn a new language?”  It is the other way around for me, I love translating above anything else, but cannot make myself take the time to learn any language well enough to actually be able to do it.  But is translation about language? Translation theorists have come so far in recognising the complexities of finding linguistic equivalences that translation can only exist through a kind of “collusion between translator and reader” in which “readers choose (or accept or authenticate) translations that are fit for purpose,” as Simon Perris puts it in his book about translations of Euripides (The Gentle, Jealous God – brilliant title).  For Theo Hermans, one of the translation theorists Perris cites, it is not the reader but the author, or a publisher, who authenticates a translation, establishing the equivalence of one text with another by “explicitly describing a target text as a ‘translation’ of its source text.”  What equivalence can’t be in “an inherent feature of relations between texts.”  No two languages are identical, after all, or they wouldn’t be two languages, they’d be the same language.  So what are translators doing?  All Perris can say about a translation is to call it “a text which repeats or gives an impression of repeating a text in another language,” but to suggest it “repeats” a text in another language raises all the questions that equivalence raises so we are left with a text which “gives an impression” of repeating another text, which makes me think of the improv comedy routine in which the comedians burble away in languages that aren’t languages at all.
But the assumption here is that the translator is translating the language.  If we assume the translator is translating meaning the problem largely vanishes.  If language refers to things in the world, another word can equally refer to the thing, and while this is more true of the objects themselves than the associations, codes, and contexts they suggest, all of this kind of interpretation of meaning happens even within the same language when a book is read in another country, or another time, or even just by a different reader. A literary work – or a conversation – isn’t just made up of words but by patterns of meaning, the unfolding of a narrative, the revelation of a relevant detail, the withholding of another, the repetition of a thought or a memory, the comparison of one thing with another.  No one writes in original words, all originality of thought comes out of the relation of one word to another, one thought to another thought.  Translation doesn’t translate words, it translates patterns.  And of course a pattern can be repeated in another language!  It is never going to be an exact equivalent but that is what makes translation such an endlessly enthralling and creative art.  Any translation is a creative translation, the most faithful perhaps the most creative of all.  The translator Lily Meyer goes so far – as have other translation theorists – as to argue that to translate a book is to write a book, which of course it quite self-evidently is – in one sense.  But there is more to writing a book than coming up with the words, which is all the translator has to do (and considerably helped by the fact that words for the words are already suggested in another language).  The idea that every translation is an original work might seem to solve a philosophical problem but I am still sure it would be cheating to translate a book from another language and pass it off as your own work.  Translating is about language, then, because writing books isn't really about the words at all.  
 
 
 
 
 

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21/12/2019 0 Comments

On poetry and the forms grief takes

When I was young and heartbroken my friend Diana drew me a picture of a toothbrush with teeth instead of bristles.  I had completely forgotten this but it is recorded in a diary I kept at the time and surprisingly it did seem to have consoled me somewhat.  Only Diana could have come up with such an unlikely and yet effective gesture.  This is by way of thinking about grief and form.  One of the reasons why I find Robert Lax’s port poem so consoling is that it is almost pure form, just a repetitive arrangement of formal elements that offer such minimal meaning.  I have been reading and rereading two books of poetry this year that are organised around structures of grief, no, structures for grief, or for the expression of grief, or the organisation of grief, if I am not now just repeating the same words in various arrangements, which is in fact one of the ways grief can be expressed (or organised, or structured).  One of these is Anne Kennedy’s Moth Hour, in which she looks back to the death of her brother in 1973, and runs a really very lovely poem he wrote through a series of variations.  In the essay at the very end of the book she tells how she listened, in the days and months after his death to Beethoven’s Diabelli variations.  These poems that begin as variations on images and lines from Philip’s poem take off, as Anne writes of the Beethoven talking off, into more and more complexity, looping in more and more memories, stories, daily detritus, daily treasure, language play and language seriousness, till they swell to a kind of crescendo of thinking and feeling in the long lines of variations 30 and 31.  Philip’s poem imagines the self caught in a jar like an insect, fed on leaves and The Book of Tea, with a pen and paper to write on.  It is a poem as much about the child on the outside of the jar, instructed “to collect your imaginary mind.”  The imaginary mind is collected in these variations, which becomes, in variation 30, the collective imagination, entrapped and yet watched, and loved, of the generations X, Y and Z, defined in part in opposition to the “They” of variation 31.  I love the word “they,” all the ways in which this most wonderfully flexible word can work, and perhaps most especially the paranoiac way in which it seems to designate some controlling group responsible for everything that has gone wrong, in a world controlled and constructed far beyond our own volition, even as we become a part of the controlling, destructive generation.  “If I keep going with this poem I will break poetry,” the poet writes.  Almost!  But poetry is hard to break.  Already in variations 32 and 33 the pull towards the aphorism can be felt, but the repetitions and images also keep open the resonance of poetry.  The second section, The Thé, is miraculous, in its combination of brevity and reach, aphorism and whatever the opposite of aphorism is, something beyond narrative and poetry, and I have been thinking about brevity and poetry in ways this extraordinary work extends, but that will have to be for another post because I am discovering another rule which is these have to be written in one go, or edited in one go if I’m taking something I wrote from somewhere else, and I was going to write about Vana Manasiadis’s  The Grief Almanac, which is another complex and lovely collection of poems structured around grief.  The complexity of grief structures is suggested before the book is even opened, with the mesmerising cover art by Marian Maguire offering directions for the eye to take upwards and downwards, backwards and forwards, looking like a labyrinth without quite offering pathways to anywhere.  This is a book of indirect correspondances between the left-hand side pages and the right-hand side pages, each side offering its own way through a navigation of memory and response.  The collection ends with the yearning for (and promise of) a continued call and response between mother and daughter, and such a yearning, and such a promise, is all through the book in the ways memories sit opposite descriptions of art-works, narratives are presented in letter form, the past is pulled into the present, the present breaks into pieces, days cannot be disentangled one from another.  “The present pulls the plug on the present moment by moment,” Anne Kennedy writes in Moth Hour, and in The Grief Almanac Vana Manasiadis writes, “I’m leaving too, the me you knew, the me I knew with you.”  Grief sharpens the present moment into such a dazzle, such a dazzle of departure.  As Anne Kennedy also writes, “Beauty is the thing that goes surprise!” 
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19/12/2019 0 Comments

On dreams as the royal road to consciousness

It was in November I had a recurring dream motif about a terrier.  It wasn’t a recurring dream but a recurring terrier that appeared in dream after dream needing to be released.  It did seem as if my unconscious was hard at work trying to tell me something I was repeatedly failing to grasp.  A terrier is a good image itself for the work of digging up something still alive from under the ground, but I wondered whether I could hear terrier as a version of the word worrier, a worrier being not someone who makes you worry but someone who themselves worries, who worries away at things like a terrier might worry away at a sock.  A terrier would be someone who allows themselves actually to indulge in the feeling of terror.  I have a way of telling myself “I am not okay but I will be okay,” but maybe I need to stop saying that, or maybe the terrier is not myself but represents someone else’s terror which needs to be heard. 

This kind of reading might seem to depend on Freud’s idea of dreams as the royal road to the unconscious, with the unconscious having all the answers that we consciously repress in order to carry on with our lives as they are.  It is such a resonant idea about how the self plays out I am not going to entirely let go of it, but it doesn’t seem to be very accurate.   What is now known of the unconscious is not the controlling, crafty unconscious that Freud distinguishes from the pre-conscious but something far more like that pre-conscious itself, unarranged, unobserved material that means nothing.  Dreams as we dream them seem to be best understood as nothing more than a kind of preconscious array of images that are only assembled into any kind of meaning as we wake.  What they mean has nothing to do with the unconscious but everything to do with our waking consciousness, consciousness being all about narrative.
​
It is Coleridge, not Freud, who comes closer to being the Freud for our times, Coleridge who a century earlier was exploring how the narrativizing, meaning-creating consciousness makes ghosts out of pre-consciously perceived phenomena. And it was not Freud, but Coleridge, who invented the term “psychosomatic.”  Consciousness, in other words, is quite mysterious and powerful enough to be going on with.  On the other hand, Coleridge also claimed to have dreamed the Kubla Khan poem, and Simon last night dreamed about zombies that were impossible to tell apart from humans.  “Then how did you know they were zombies?” “Because they were chasing me.”  “Did you get away?”  “Yes.  I tricked them.”  “How?”  “I told them to go that way” – pointing the other way.  
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18/12/2019 1 Comment

On poetry and refusal

Poetry can be a form of refusal I think as well as openness.  It can be a refusal in its openness, a refusal to shut down, a refusal to let thinking be limited by cultural and genre expectations.  I often write poetry as a form of resistance to getting on with whatever I ought to be getting on with.  Yes, but that’s not what I want to write about.  It is nearly Christmas and there is a lot that we might want to feel open to refusing.  Christmas can be hard, an extended performance of goodwill we might not feel, a celebration when it might be more important to grieve, a time of togetherness when we might not be able to be with the people we love the most.  There is a poem I love by Muriel Rukeyser called “Effort of Speech Between Two People,” which I could love for the title alone, but love for the repetition through the poem of the phrases “I am not happy” and “I will be open.”  It is a poem full of stories, from childhood through adolescence into adulthood and a relationship with someone, “he,” the poet/speaker thinks now never loved her, and there is a “you,” perhaps not the same person, whom the poem addresses, and there is an effort of speech, a wish to be known and to know the other person.  But this isn’t the poem I want to write about.  The poem I want to write about is simply a poem of refusal, even while it is a poem about longing.  In the poem, it is the port longing, and refusing to focus the longing on any particular ship, but I like to read it when I, myself, am full of longing, but instead of looking for a harbour from my longing, can read this poem to stay with that depth of grief.  It makes it easy, because it offers such an insistent refusal, without any emotion, it is pure pattern, and I find it quite funny even while it somehow speaks to my own sorrow.  It is by the American poet Robert Lax.  I recommend reading it out loud.  
 
The port
was longing
 
the port
was longing
 
not for
this ship
not for
that ship
 
not for
this ship
not for
that ship
 
the port
was longing
 
the port
was longing
 
not for
this sea
not for
that sea
 
not for
this sea
not for
that sea
 
the port
was longing
 
the port
was longing
 
not for
this &
not for
that
 
not for
this &
not for
that
 
the port
was longing
 
the port
was longing
 
not for
this &
 
not for
that
 
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16/12/2019 0 Comments

On the haunting of C sharp


J M Coetzee describes listening to Bach as a boy, with no education in classical music, and feeling “I was being spoken to by the music as music had never spoken to me before.”  Thinking how he can have come to have such a transcendant experience, Coetzee observes that in Bach’s music “nothing is obscure, no single step is so miraculous as to surpass imitation,” but in combination the notes represent “the incarnation of ideas of exposition, complication and resolution that are more general than music.  Bach thinks in music.  Music thinks itself in Bach.”  I have also learnt to listen to Bach by listening to Bach.  I was surprised by this anecdote all the same because it comes in the middle of an essay, “What is a Classic,” that is mostly about how a classic is defined by its own cultural status, and about how the emphasis of earlier writers like T S Eliot on some transcendant realm of literature is a way of justifying the propagation of an imperialist ideology.

Far more obviously than music, literature engages with ideas that are cultural, historical, political, ideological.  Claiming any kind of “transcendant” or “universal” experience of literature is easily read as universalizing historical values, as if what you are claiming is that a classical standard of beauty or literary value is the correct standard against which all literature can be measured, and as if you are claiming values such as stoicness, perhaps, or fidelity, should be held to as universal values transcending politics and history.  But if literature also “thinks itself” through the individual artwork, perhaps this can allow a universality of access that is independent of any universal agreement about the values, or concepts, involved, just as you don’t have to have any particular commitment to the note C sharp to appreciate its place in a Bach sonata?
​
What does happen if you put a concept, like empire, or loyalty, or friendship into the place of the note C sharp?  Can we really understand a concept in purely formal terms?  Even before we come to the question of allegiance, there is the question of comprehension: are we hearing anything so stable as a note on a musical scale?  How do we know we are not reading the text off-key?  Are we, to a certain extent, making up our own tune?  This is when we turn to classical philology, to “roll back the years and reveal to us the original in all its gleaming, pristine purity,” as classicist Charles Martindale puts it, to emphasise the absurdity of such an enterprise, as if the original were ever “pristine,” outside of history and free of competing interpretations.  For a reception theorist like Martindale, concepts are always multivalent, and the shifts in meaning and interpretation across time are a part of the rich multiplicity of readings that a text allows.  A text is not a well wrought urn, as Cleanth Brooks has it, with the suggestion this also inevitably evokes (although only inevitably if you’ve read Keats) of the frozen figures on the urn, forever beautiful because forever still.  If a text is made up of concepts, these are inextricable from the play of ideology and ideas outside the text, in the historical moment in which it was written and beyond. 

Yet I hold three positions on this, all at the same time.  With Martindale, I see a text as having meanings that extend beyond the text, that are culturally constructed, and therefore also always changing.  At the same time, I also see a value in the work of the philologist and the historian to establish the significance of the terms and concepts at play in the texts, the work that allows us to hear C sharp as C sharp.  But I also think the text itself demands we hear C sharp as C sharp.  A philologist reads the word in relation to other textual uses of the word at the same historical period, but in each case the meaning of the word is defined too by its position within the system of values proposed by the work itself with its own “ideas of exposition, complication and resolution.”  To a certain extent, our understanding of the concept of loyalty, or empire, or gratitude depends on what it must mean, aesthetically, for the work of literature to work as a piece of literature.  (Just as we can determine the pronunciation of words in part by the demands of a rhyme scheme or the metre.)  And I think this means that we can be free to love the place of the concept within the aesthetic order of the text, without having to have any allegiance to the concept outside the text.  It is a suspension not of disbelief but of value.  Just as we believe in the ghost haunting a ghost story without having to believe in ghosts outside the story, so we can be haunted by beliefs or values we do not hold, but can allow to run through us as we haunt, in our turn, the literature we read. 
 

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15/12/2019 0 Comments

On birds and personalities

Listening to birds is one of the things I like best about every day and I like watching them, too, as Diana and I did yesterday while sitting and talking under a pohutakawa tree for so long the birds who had flown away all returned and got on with their lives above us.  But all I am seeing is birds, not particular birds with personalities – I can tell the difference between a tui and a blackbird but not between one blackbird and another, and I can’t tell anything about a particular bird’s personality by watching it.  Yet when I think of how individual each of my hens is, it must be true that each blackbird has a quite distinct personality, quite unlike any other blackbird.  The song that Keats’s nightingale sang may have been the self-same song that another nightingale sang to Ruth when she stood in tears amidst the alien corn, and there is something consoling in thinking of us still hearing the same bird songs now that people heard centuries ago, but the individual bird that sang then was irreplaceable, one of a kind, with its own world map of everything it knew, and with its own quite individual personality.  
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11/12/2019 0 Comments

On animals and culture

This follows on from the post a few days ago on species and persons, about how most cats are just cats, whereas your own cat becomes something more like a person, a friend and colleague as Jan Morris says about her cat Ibsen, and to the cat perhaps their own people become something more than just human beings.  We don't really know how much animals have their own different cultures from one rabbit warren to another for instance, or what it means for songbirds and whales to have different dialects, but I'm interested in how differently animals learn to live when they live with people.  I read an anthropologist's article about living with rabbits in order to study their culture, the structures of relationship between individual rabbits and what this meant for group rabbit culture.  But I think she was quite conscious that this culture was also a rabbit-human culture, since these were rabbits that lived in her house and had a relationship with her.  We had a rabbit once who lived in our house and since it was just one rabbit the only culture it had was one it shared with us, and it was a very different rabbit than rabbits I've known as pets that live outside the house, in an outdoors enclosure with one or more other rabbits, let alone rabbits who live in the wild.  And my first pet hen I had as a child I kept at first as a single hen, until the neighbours got hens, so she joined the flock of people and cats she found in our household, working out a hybrid culture that could make sense of quite different instincts and behaviours.  She was quite assertive about her place at the top of the pecking order.  In the mornings she would go round all the beds shooing the cats off them, often laying an egg in the warm hollow where a cat had been.  Cats are really the strangest of all, choosing to be with people rather than other cats, behaving like kittens into adulthood, working out codes for having doors opened or laps provided, and meowing to people when meow isn't something cats apparently ever say to other cats.  
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9/12/2019 1 Comment

On poetry as a conceptual game


I kind of like the idea of poetry as a conceptual game, although I am not much of a games player on the whole.  In the art world, amateur artists are discounted not because they can’t paint well (or sculpt or whatever) but because they aren’t making meaningful moves in a conceptual game or (even less meaningfully) positioning themselves in terms of an art market.  The idea of poetry as a conceptual game comes across when an innovative practice is called a “poetry move,” except by the time it is called a “poetry move” it is perhaps no longer innovative but already recognised as a move that has already been played out.  This was how most poets responded to Mike Young’s 2010 blog post of the poetry moves list he drew up Elisa Gabbert, as a list of moves you would now have to avoid. Elisa Gabbert wrote a follow-up piece about one of the examples of poetry moves in the original post, “exposed revision,” which they’d illustrated with lines from Alice Fulton’s “About Face” (“At least embarrassment is not an imitation. / It's intimacy for beginners, / the orgasm no one cares to fake. / I almost admire it.  I almost wrote despise.”):
​
                  I first read this poem in college and really loved that move, the sort of exposed revision.  And I do think of it as a "move" now,                          though I'm not sure I did then. I guess this comes from having both read and written a lot more poetry and being able to                                     recognize techniques and strategies as patterns. Realizing not everything is original and born of pure inspiration.                                                     Poetry is kind of like chess in that way: there are an infinite number of possible games, but  experienced players know the                                 classic openings and defences and so on.

But if poetry is like a game of chess, it is like a much more interesting game of chess than chess.  There might be an infinite number of possible chess games, but the game itself remains the same.  Poetry, on the other hand, is a game that continually evolves, as if the board that chess was played on was infinitely expansive, the moves that were allowed for any piece could be added to and altered, new chess pieces could be introduced to the board, and the purpose of the game itself was always evolving. Even so, the moves in this evolving game still have their meaning because of the game as it is established so far.  Moves will mean nothing if they are entirely random, if they take place off the board – unless perhaps a brilliant critic gets in on the act.  “I wasn’t playing, I was only tidying up the pieces left over on the floor” protests the cleaner, and the critic writes up this new and brilliant move in a way that has any young player up with the play claiming to be “tidying up the discarded pieces,” finding new ways of tidying discarded pieces and linking this in to the game, even calling moves “tidying discarded pieces” in their artist statements when it is hard to see how it is any tidier to place a piece here rather than there, or in what sense these pieces were ever discarded in the first place.

Knowing that some poets are playing poetry as a conceptual game, wouldn’t any poet want to figure out the rules and join in?  What if I thought I was playing the game by arranging pieces in patterns that pleased me on the board, patterns that sometimes seemed to have something of the charm of earlier patterns constructed by canonical poets, when really my arrangements were at best an irrelevance, at worst were cluttering up the board?  If I’m going to read widely in contemporary poetry now, it isn’t to pick up some poetry moves already in play to fake – or even master – the writing of contemporary poetry, the game is bigger than that.  To play the game effectively means mapping out the full scope of where the players are at, recognising who the real players are, the direction the moves point towards, the goal towards which your own move must be aimed.  It is perhaps a game that can’t be played fully consciously, that involves the simultaneous recognition of so many subtle shifts and cues that an element of intuition needs to come into play. 

But if to play the game effectively today requires an almost impossibly broad knowledge of an increasingly complex, vast, and international field of play, is there a risk of substituting breadth for depth, and playing an essentially shallow game?  Is there something worth salvaging after all from T S Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” a deeper approach to the challenge of innovation?  For Eliot, playing the poetry game properly involves making moves that advance a tradition: “To conform merely would be for the new work not really to conform at all; it would not be new, and would therefore not be a work of art.”  Not only does genuinely innovative work add to the existing tradition, it alters it retrospectively: “after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted.”  The true innovator has a tremendous responsibility, not only towards the future but towards the past. And, Eliot warns, the poet “is not likely to know [the work to be done] unless he lives in what is not merely the present, but the present moment of the past.”  Those poets familiar with a range of contemporary poetry moves, and aiming to make a new move within that context, are playing a shallow game.  Because other poets are also immersed in the same range of contemporary poetry, a new move within that range will make an immediate sense and is likely to be widely taken up, but it will do nothing to alter the trajectory of literary history.

But isn’t this still a game, and is playing a game all poetry is for?  I used to feel I’d rather have liked to train as a Glass Bead player like the students in Hermann Hesse’s novel The Glass Bead Game, which imagines an intellectual game much like conceptual art or the game of poetry but involving a synthesis of all the disciplines and all the art forms, played on so meta a level that every major intellectual advance or idea, every literary or artistic move is represented by a glass bead.  The novel, which follows the progress of a child prodigy who grows up to become a master of the game, ends with his renunciation of a life he comes to see as austere and pointless in its remove from real social and political concerns; he resigns his role and leaves the order only to drown in a swimming accident.

​I can quite easily imagine giving up lake swims and a life of politics to master a game as beautiful as Hesse’s Glass Bead Game, or an idea of poetry as a series of moves in an infinitely expansive and enduring tradition.  Yet can poetry, made not out of beads but out of words, ever really be reduced to a series of moves making sense only in terms of an evolving pattern?  


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5/12/2019 0 Comments

On species and persons

​From time to time Jan Morris writes about her Norwegian cat, Ibsen, now deceased but often remembered. Thought 8 in her Thought Diary compares the true friendship she has with Ibsen with the inscrutability of other cats, who purr for whatever wild reason it is that they purr, unlike Ibsen who purrs to express friendship.  “All other cats may be just cats, but my cat Ibsen was a friend and a colleague.  My cat Ibsen was different…just like all other cats.”  I know that difference very well, the way other people’s cats, however nice, are just cats.  I grew up with cats, who were persons to me, but the strangest thing was when I got a cat as an adult, with children of my own, and for a long time it remained a cat to me, like other people’s cats.  It is hard to describe the strangeness of this.  Eventually Rufy did in fact become a person to me, by imperceptible degrees so I can’t remember when, though I don’t think it was ever quite like the relationship I had with our childhood cats.  I read an article once about children’s concepts of family, which revealed that for children there is often no distinction for them between the human and animal members of their family.  Pets are closer family members to them than their extended family.  Prompted by the researchers to think past the immediate family, asked whether their grandparents for instance are family, they will enthusiastically agree and include the grandparents’ own pets as well.  But what I think now is, this must also be how it is for the pets themselves.  Our cat is shy of people she doesn’t know and it occurs to me that to her, other people probably aren’t persons at all, but human beings, just as other cats aren’t persons to me but cats.  I like cats, she doesn’t on the whole like human beings, but we relate to each other as persons, not in terms of species.  
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5/12/2019 0 Comments

On the maths of not doing enough

I have been thinking about the maths of how much changing of the world I am responsible for taking on.  Obviously this makes little real sense but I am looking for some sort of workable starting point.  It makes an intuitive sense to me that we have more responsibility for those we are directly in relation with, and the closer the relation the more responsibility we have.  Peter Singer suggests that our ethical obligation to rescue a child drowning in front of us is identical to our ethical obligation to pay the same amount of money if it were to save the life of a child anywhere in the world, by funding a mosquito net for instance.  Yet Singer does find it difficult to find a limit to the obligations such a consequentialist view leads to.  Do you give all you have, always?  That is one magnificent answer of course.  It is in fact the only completely pure moral answer.  Short of that, does that leave us only with the demands made of us directly, and our responsibilities to those in our care?  40 billion chickens may be raised in battery farms, but we can still make sure our own chickens have company, shelter, the chance to roam, maybe the occasional strawberry muffin and a good rummage through a turned over compost heap.   8 million tons of plastic end up in the oceans every year but we will still pick up a plastic bag blowing past us on the street.  We do these things within a world collapsing around us and it isn’t enough.  What would be enough?  It isn’t enough, but we can at least do our share.  It is on this basis that Singer calculates the proportion of any one person’s income that should be given to help solve extreme poverty world-wide: taking the total amount it would cost to eliminate global poverty, and assigning graduated income-based donation percentages in order to cover that amount.  This works out as 2.5 % for instance of an income of $50,000, not impossible.  To combat climate change, the most effective solution is to plant trees.  One trillion trees could store 225 billion tons (205 billion metric tons) of carbon, or about two-thirds of the 330 billion tons (300 billion metric tons) of carbon that humans have released into the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution began.  This is going to require an unprecedented coordination of will and resources from governments around the world and perhaps it makes little sense to work on an individual scale.  Yet if we divide 1 trillion by the number of people in the world, 7.7 billion, we get the number of trees, 130, that would be each individual’s share.  True, if everyone planted 130 trees in their own neighbourhood we’d soon run out of room for trees in the cities.  Even so, and even as I continue to vote for political parties and policies addressing poverty and climate change, not to mention kinder farming practices and the reduction of plastics, I am also going to plant 130 trees.     
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